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Deconstructing the Democratic Developmental
State: Blocked Democratization and Political
Parties in Nigeria and South Korea
Daniel A. Omoweh
Introduction
The chapter problematizes the democratization agenda of the state in Nigeria
and South Korea within the context of  deconstructing the DDS. It argues that
the state’s zero-sum politics blocks the process of  democratizing development
and the political parties from getting underway. It examines the history, leadership
and governance of the political parties in both countries, taking note of the political
contestations and internal democratic practices within and between the political
parties. It looks critically at the manner in which the political parties were formed,
disbanded, merged and regrouped, paying attention to the privatization of the
parties by a few powerful and rich members, leaving the majority of the members
of the parties politically disempowered.
The chapter recommends the need to democratize the governance of the
entire development process and the political parties in particular; and to institute
the democratization process through the creation of appropriate political spaces
for civil society groups where they could act as a check on ambiguous and anti-
people policies of the state and its inability to produce the public good. It
recommends the formation of  social, political and economic movements that
can empower the people, groups and communities to pressurize the state to
deliver on national development. In part, this is because such movements not
only provide the platform for political parties with clearly defined ideologies of
development and politics in the process, but imbue the members, the citizenry
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and political institutions with democratic norms and practices. That way, the
democratization of the political parties will produce the political leadership with
a democratic culture that will help to facilitate the rise of  the DDS in both countries.
Until the crisis that rocked South Korea’s economy in the late 1990s, the country’s
rapid economic growth was already taken as a development model for Nigeria
and Africa by scholars like Alice Amsden and Samuel Huntington, and by the
Bretton Woods Institutions and policy makers. There was so much focus on the
Korean state’s obsession with growth that no attention was given to its nature,
politics and democratization project, if  it had any. Before the crisis, a comparison
between the two countries to examine the issue of development would have
been dismissed as irrelevant by many African scholars – as the author did in an
earlier work (Omoweh: 2005) – except if it were to draw lessons for Nigeria
from South Korea. The chapter further redresses such a misconception.
As noted in Chapter One, most of the discourses on the democratic
developmental state are largely comparative, although the majority of scholars
have not really developed paradigms to guide the researches either by direct
modelling or establishing rules and the limits of what is possible in such interro-
gative efforts. There is a need for creating a comparative paradigm that will capture
the various development trajectories of  the Southern countries while formulating
the strategies for the emergence of a democratic, developmental state.
Chapter Three thus locates the discourse on blocked democratization as it
deconstructs the DDS and its feasibility in Nigeria and South Korea, using the
framework of  Marxist political economy. The rationale for deploying this
approach, notwithstanding its limitations, resides in its capacity to establish the
dialectics of development and the common class traits in the political leaderships
of  both countries. In this sense, it regards the history of  Nigeria and South Korea
as a totality, in which the phenomenon of  imperialism caused by British and
Japanese colonialism played a crucial role in shaping the present structure of the
political leadership, political parties, democratization and economic development
in both countries.
Further, the framework of inquiry recognizes the similarities and differences
in the political systems of Nigeria and South Korea as an intrinsic part of the
democratization project. For instance, Nigeria and South Korea operate a
presidential system of  government, with the difference that Nigeria’s president
has a constitutional limit of  two terms of  four years each, its Korean counterpart
lays down a single term of  five years. Whereas Nigeria’s National Parliament is
bicameral – the Senate and House of Representatives with proportional
representation – Korea’s legislature is unicameral with the majority of  the seats
based on a single-member constituency with only a few candidates elected by
proportional representation. Korea’s electoral law permits independent candidates
to contest for elective positions; this contrasts sharply with the situation in Nigeria
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where no such opportunity exists in the country’s electoral law. Both countries
operate multiparty systems; the trend of two major political parties dominating
the political landscape is common to them. First, it seems as well to discuss briefly
some of the contradictions of the post-colonial state in Nigeria and South Korea.
The Antimony of the Authoritarian State and its Politics
In Nigeria, even though the political space has been marginally liberalized since
May 29 1999, when Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration was inaugurated after a
prolonged period of  military rule, the Nigerian state has remained predatory,
repressive and totalitarian. Politics is still zero-sum and brutish. The antecedents
of the current state such as repression, predatory political behaviour and parasitism
remain in place. Rather than democratize the polity and promote inclusive politics
amid a complex plurality, the state continues to exclude more and more people
from the political and development processes. The massively rigged general
elections held in April 2007, with the attendant nullification of gubernatorial and
parliamentary results by the election petition tribunals and the appellate courts,
was indicative of the inability of the state to conduct credible elections after 47
years of political independence. It also gave useful insights into the depth of
political decay in the country.
The vigour of the civil society groups and the pro-democracy activities mounted
by the Civil Liberty Organization (CLO), the Committee for the Defence of
Human Rights (CDHR) and the National Coalition for Democracy (NADECO),
the National Labour Congress (NLC) and National Association of Nigerian
Students (NANS) that chased the military from the political scene in the 1980s
and mid-1990s has been extinguished since the onset of the civilian government
in May 1999, partly because of the entry of their key members into partisan
politics. The same is true of  the majority of  political activists who found
participation in partisan politics more lucrative than forming political, social,
economic and environmental movements to agitate for change and to pressurize
the state to deliver public goods.
Worse still, the political elites have, on account of  the kind of  politics they
play, not only alienated themselves from the people, but have been held hostage
by them. Lacking in legitimacy, the political leadership resorts to bloody violence
at all levels of  political competition in order to remain in power. Coupled with
the state managers’ tenuous relationship with production, politics has become the
only lucrative business and the dominant means of accumulation in town. Hence,
the political elites fight fiercely to penetrate the state, access its political power and
retain it at all cost once it is captured.
While the process of  forming and registering political parties has remained
relatively open since 1999, the internal governance of the parties has hardly been
liberalized. In fact, a few and rich politicians have captured and privatized the
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political parties to meet their narrow gains, thereby re-orienting the parties away
from their basic functions of  interest articulation, aggregation and political
education. As a result, political parties have become vehicles for power acquisition
and surplus extraction. This has had dire consequences for internal democratic
practices within the parties.
The Korean state’s approach to politics is not significantly different from its
Nigerian counterpart in several ways. Politically, the autocratic Korean state still
suffers from huge democratic deficits and weak political institutions. After over
six decades of  political independence, there is really nothing to suggest that the
Korean political leadership is interested in democratizing the polity, economy and
political parties. The level of  political activism demonstrated by the labour unions,
university teachers and student unionism in the late 1940s and 1950s, which resulted
in the Kyonju massacre during which thousands of students, labour union members
and academics were killed by the military and other state security operatives, has
not been re-ignited in the country since the 1980s. In fact, Syngman Rhee, an
academic who fled to the United States and was returned by the US government
to be the country’s President after the end of  the Korean War in 1954, could not
reverse the Hobbesian politics of the Korean state.
Labour and student unionisms are well organized and resistant, but they are
not really a countervailing force in the country’s body politic like their counterparts
in Nigeria. Civil society groups are regularly cracked down on, and potential
social, political and economic movements nipped in the bud by the state security
agents. South Korea’s positioning as a bulwark for containing Sino-Russian extension
of socialism into the southern Korean peninsula and Southeast Asia, coupled
with the frosty relationship with its North Korean neighbour, reinforce the
authoritarianism of  the state and its undemocratic practices. The country’s
geopolitics and the security implications for the peninsula have become an alibi
for the state’s repressive policies and reluctance to open up the political space.
This has further entrenched a tiny political class within the state that decides who
will become the political actors and shapes the nature and outcome of political
competition and development in the country. In such circumstances, the state
remains unaccountable, as corruption deepens in the economy.
It is not surprising that the small number of rich, senior politicians benefit
from the government that established political parties to reinforce their inordinate
political ambitions. The parties’ manifestoes are no less a representation of  the
narrow world views and interests of  the founders. The membership of  parties
remains closed. Even though the Koreans are a homogeneous group of people,
they are extremely divided along the exploitative interests of the key founding
members of  the parties and key political leadership. The influential politicians and
top bureaucrats have used their positions to carve out the country into spheres of
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political interests and party strongholds, leaving other areas like the Chejudo islands
as the underdogs and marginalized.
The Korean state’s economic development policy and programmes were in
sharp contrast with Nigeria’s. By 1960, 15 years after South Korea gained political
independence the Korean economy was still largely underdeveloped and had
similar basic economic indicators to Nigeria’s. South Korea’s per capita income
of  US$95 was only slightly higher than Nigeria’s US$93. The economy was equally
ridden with acute poverty and deepening social, political and economic crises.
By the late 1970s, South Korea’s economy grew at five percent annually. Coupled
with its per capita income of US$3500, which continued into the early 1980s, the
Korean state earned the status of a ‘late industrializer’, while suffocated under
debt peonage and political and economic crises. Scholars like Byon-Nak and
Amsden described South Korea as ‘Asia’s next giant’ and characterized the Korean
state as developmental (Byon-Nak 1995; Amsden 1989).
However, contrary to the expectations of the majority of scholars, the chaebols
or large conglomerates that ought to have been a major feature of the
developmental state were seen by critics as South Korea Incorporated, because
they provided safe havens for corrupt practices by a small group of politicians
and government officials to accumulate wealth. South Korea’s rapid economic
growth could not be sustained largely because of the lack of a virile indigenous
business class and lagging democratization in the country’s development process.
Samuel Huntington’s characterization of  South Korea as possessing a ‘hard state’
and his recommendation that it be a model for the developing countries like
Nigeria, crashed like a pack of card in the late 1990s (Huntington 1991). Korean
society, like its Nigerian counterpart, is still strictly divided into two opposing
classes: the rich and the poor, with the middle class completely wiped out
(Omoweh 2005).
It can, therefore, be argued that the contradictions of the authoritarian state
can impede the emergence of  a democratic political leadership in both countries.
Here it is useful to examine the extent of democratization of the development
process generally and the political parties in particular. What is democratization?
How is democratization blocked from taking roots in the political parties? What
are the implications of all this for the prospects of the DDS in Nigeria and South
Korea? These questions are dealt with in the rest of  the chapter.
Blocked Democratization
Democratization is concerned with the empowerment of  the people to participate
effectively in the development process inclusive of  politics. To democratize
development entails the empowerment of  the people to decide the kind of  the
development they desire, which should be experiential. It allows the people to
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participate, to implement and to renew the path to development. In doing so, the
people become the agent, means and essence of development.
To democratize the polity entails creating a framework for a broad-based
participation in politics inclusive of the opposition, in the hope that it allows the
people to freely choose who governs them. It means the liberty of the people to
exercise an oversight function on their representatives in government by making
them account for their actions or inactions on issues that pertain to their wellbeing
and the societal development. It is also necessary to democratize the opposition
parties because they can act as a critical shadow government that plays the role of
a watch dog towards the incumbent regime in order to promote good governance
and participatory development. The democratization of the polity also involves
the enthronement of  democratic practices in the machinery of  political parties.
As a framework for political development, democratization promotes healthy
political competition between and among political actors. It helps to sustain
democratic political transition across governments over long periods.
In spite of the advantages of democratization, it is often found to be blocked.
The process of democratization is blocked from taking roots in the overall
development process, economy, the polity and the political parties, largely because
the political elites resist democratization. It is not because the political elites are
ignorant of its crucial role in deepening the democratic process and fostering
people-centred development. On the contrary, the political elites dread
democratization, largely because they equate the empowerment of  the people in
the development process to a reduction in the political power of  the state managers.
It is all the more so because of  the state’s totalistic conception of  politics, which
prevents the process of democratizing politics and economic development from
getting underway in the first place.
On account of the nature and politics of post-colonial states like Nigeria and
South Korea, the concern is not really about democracy, but whether
democratization is even on the agenda of  the state managers. For the political
elites only pay lip service to democracy while being vehemently opposed to the
political empowerment of  the people in whom the ultimate political power resides.
All this significantly accounts for why the state can hardly embark on political
reforms, inclusive of  the political parties, that seeks to liberalize the process and
bring about a substantive democratic change in the political leadership. The state
only repositions its clients to occupy sensitive political positions both in government
and political parties in order to retain its firm grip on political power and accomplish
its limited social, economic and political interests and those of the institutions that
make it a reality.
The contention that the democratization process is blocked does not foreclose
the possibility of elections; nor does it mean halting the creation of political
institutions like political parties and a parliament in Nigeria and South Korea. On
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the contrary, the concern is about the state managers, who continue to recycle
spent politicians and cronies in government, political appointments and in the
leadership and machineries of  the political parties. It is the unwillingness of  the
political leadership to open up the political space or set in motion a process that
allows the people to actualize their inalienable rights that is at issue. An example
of this tendency more broadly is the increasing trend for presidents of African
countries to continue in office after serving out their term of  office, and in so
doping continue to decide who contests for top elective positions in government
and political parties and who gets the plum political appointments (Southall &
Melber 2006). Given such prevalent attitudes among political elites, the process
of  democratization can hardly take root in the polity and herein lies, in part, its crisis.
The Crisis of  Democratization and Political Parties
There is a critical linkage between the level of internal democratization in the
political parties and among national political leaders and the democratic
developmental state. Democratization cannot survive in a country without
democratized political parties. This is because party political leadership has first to
imbibe democratic principles, values and practices, before such virtues are likely
to spread throughout national political institutions. Strong political parties having
profound internal democratic governance mechanisms and constructive inter-
and intra-party relations are largely indicative of democratic growth and
development.
Further, the kind of political parties and the capacity to conduct free and fair
party elections gives a critical insight into the nature of the political leadership and
the character of  the democracy being built in the society. The level of  intra- and
inter-party democracy determines whether democratization is even underway in
the first place. It gives an idea of the credibility of elections, democratic
consolidation and renewal. It establishes the linkage between the political parties
and the people.
The weakness of internal democratic practices within political parties dims
the prospects for the DDS even in the more politically developed countries of
the North. Chapter Four of  this work sheds light on this with the experiences of
Latin American countries.
Maurice Duverger had rightly noted that politicians formed the original political
parties, which were called cadre parties, as their congressional caucuses became
stable (Duverger 1954). John Aldrich elaborated on Duverger’s thesis, contending
that political parties arose as politicians sought to gain office and pursue their
goals. Further, with the increase in the size of  the electorates, new ways were
devised to overcome the problem of gathering electoral support and this led to
the formation of  mass parties (Aldrich 1995).
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Political parties are formed to play the crucial roles of  political recruitment,
interest articulation and aggregation, political education and capacity building of
the political leadership. But the majority of  the political parties in the countries of
the South have been unable to perform these functions credibly, due largely to
the complex historical antecedents of the state and inadequate governance
mechanisms.
In the colonial histories of Nigeria and South Korea, for instance, political
parties were created as an instrument to facilitate either the transfer of power
from colonial regimes to the local political elite; or they were formed by the local
political leadership to fight colonialism. Once the colonial state was driven out,
political parties degenerated into ethnic and regional groups, acting in most cases
as the vanguard of  local hegemonic forces to meet their narrow interests. In such
circumstances, the people could not have been empowered to have any say in
how the political parties were governed.
Further, the fledgling political parties were to face greater challenges as they
were confronted with the need to choose among ideological positions that would
guide their policy implementation. Swayed between the two ideological extremes
of  capitalism and socialism, political parties supported welfarist or conservative
perspectives, depending on the preferences of founding members of the parties,
but without sticking to any of them. Key leaders who provided finance to the
parties cashed in on their leverage to occupy top political positions both in the
parties and in government. The national leaders of the parties were, in most
cases, the owners of the parties, whose interests and world views ultimately became
the objectives, manifestoes, rules and regulations of  the parties. Political parties
were no less than the personal property of their leaders, who decided on who
should a member. That way, membership of  political parties was exclusive, and
further reinforced the disempowerment of  the people and their lack of  ability to
participate in party and national politics. Let me elaborate on these points by
considering the examples of Nigeria and South Korea.
In Nigeria, under the First Republic, 1960-1966, there were three dominant
political parties. The Action Group (AG), largely a Yoruba party, was led by
Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba man, who doubled as the Premier of  the Western
region. The Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), regarded as Hausa-Fulani party,
had its major base located in the North and was led by Ahmadu Bello, Premier
of  Northern region, a Fulani and descendant of  Othman Dan Fodio, while Tafawa
Balewa, also a Northerner, was the party’s deputy national leader and the Prime
Minister of Nigeria. The National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC)
was the party for the Igbos, with Nnamdi Azikiwe, as its leader, who later became
the President of Nigeria. That parties from the outset reflected the interests of
the major ethnic blocs was itself an early threat to the democratization of the
political parties.
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Worse still, the ethnic basis of  the parties facilitated the rise of  autocratic and
ethnic hegemonic leaders, who were unable to rise above ethnic agendas at both
regional and national levels. This, in turn, further fragmented the leadership of  the
parties so much that the majority of the top politicians lacked the credentials to
be a nation-wide leader able to appeal across ethnic divisions.
However, with the resumption of party politics in 1979, after a prolonged
period of  military rule from 1966, six major parties were formed, namely, National
Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigeria Peoples
Party (NPP), Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP), National Advance Party (NAP)
and Peoples Redemption Party (PRP). The national leaders of the parties were
literally separated from the incumbents in government. For instance, Adisa Akinloye
was the chairman of  the ruling party, the NPN, while Shehu Shagari of  the same
party was the President of Nigeria. But the separation of such offices in the party
did not translate into internal democratic practices, as the national, sub-national
and local leadership and the machineries of the party were still undemocratic in
the conduct of candidate selection, openness, rights of members, budgets and
expenditures and gender issues.
This was indeed the case in the UPN, the major opposition party, where the
national leader of  the party, Obafemi Awolowo was simultaneously the de facto
governor of  the UPN-controlled states of  Bendel, Oyo, Ogun and Ondo. There
Awolowo liked to be seen to act as an ‘honest broker’ in the party, and whoever
he anointed for office was not subject to opposition. In spite of the socialist
inclinations of  Mallam Aminu Kano, He acted in a similar way to Awolowo
while founder, chairman and presidential flag bearer of  the PRP. The same was
true of  Tunji Braithwaite of  the NAP, who was the founder, chairman, financier
and presidential candidate of  the party during the 1979 and 1999 general elections.
Thus the opposition parties could not constitute themselves into a formidable
unified opposition.
The trend of undemocratic leadership structure that characterized political
parties in the First and Second Republics continued into the Fourth Republic.
Between 1999 and 2007, for example, 56 political parties were registered in Nigeria,
with two major parties, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and All Nigeria
Peoples Party (ANPP) dominating the political scene. Other political parties are
the Action Congress (AC), All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), Labour Party
(LP), and Peoples Progressive Party and Nigerian Advanced Party (NAP). Let
me elaborate on the PDP.
Emerging as the largest political party in Africa, the PDP lacked internal
democratic governance mechanisms. Olusegun Obasanjo, two-time President of
the Federal Republic of  Nigeria (1999-2003 and 2003-2007), doubled as the
national leader of  the PDP and single-handedly appointed the national chairman
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of  the party. He was responsible for getting rid of  the founding chairman of  the
party. He removed other members of  the PDP’s board of  trustees for daring to
oppose his position on political issues. He replaced them with his surrogates who
carried out his orders. The reporting line of  the party was so designed that the
decision of the national leader on party matters was final, leaving no room for
other members of  the party to oppose unpopular views. The choice of  party
candidates for elective positions and political appointments was the prerogative
of  the national leader.
Although factions existed within the party, they were not powerful and influential
enough to unseat the national leader. The national leader decided the agenda and
outcomes of  the party primaries and conventions, and, in most cases, determined
the winners before the votes were cast. The majority of the initial financiers of
the party were virtually replaced by 2003 by the national leader. Faced with a cash
crunch to finance his second term bid, he compelled the party to source funds
from individuals and groups whose sources of wealth were questionable to
complement monies generated by the PDP-controlled states. With the failure of
the third term bid of  Olusegun Obasanjo to continue in office after May 2007,
he schemed to emerge as the chairman of  the party’s Board of  Trustees.
Equally, at the sub-national level, the governors of  the PDP-controlled states
were leaders of  the party and they also wielded enormous political power.  They
would re-organize the executives of the party at their whim in order to nip in the
bud all forms of  opposition. Although various factions and their executives existed
within the party, those that deferred to the group of  the incumbent were, in most
cases, in power. The undemocratic practices of  the party at both national and
state levels cascaded down to the council and ward levels of  the party.
It is not only the PDP that lacked internal democratic mechanisms; rather, it is
a trend that cuts across other political parties like the ANPP, AC, PPP and APGA
where democratization was not really a consideration for the leaderships of the
parties.
In South Korea, the approach by political elites to politics and the history of
the parties was not very different to their counterparts in Nigeria. As noted,
unlike in Nigeria, South Korea under the influence of the US was considered as
a bulwark to stem the spread of socialism in the region. The South Korean
political elite thus placed a high premium on national security. This influenced the
perception and conduct of politics by the Korean state. Even though some Korean
politicians, who had emerged during the period of Japanese colonialism and
helped to mediate its economic interests in the post-colonial economy, opposed
the overwhelming influence of the US policy in South Korea, security was high
on the agenda. North Korea’s later acquisition of  nuclear capacity raised the security
stakes even higher in the Korean peninsula.
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As security became a major priority in Korean politics and development, not
only was it politicized by the political elites, but its politicization dimmed the
prospect of any possibility for the democratization of the polity and of political
parties. Security became an alibi for the majority of  the political elites to perpetuate
undemocratic practices as evident in the prevalence of inadequate democratic
governance mechanisms.
In the early post-Second World War period, the major parties that arose were
the Democratic Party (DP), Democratic Republican Party (DRP), and the Liberal
Party (LP), established in 1948, 1949 and 1951 respectively. The DRP was in
power under Park Chung-hee from 1963 and upon his death in 1978 and following
the rule of Chun Doo-hwan in 1980, it was renamed Democratic Justice Party
and later called Democratic Liberal Party under President Kim Young-sam in
1993. It was renamed New Korea Party in 1995 and the Grand National Party in
1997, following its merger with the Democratic Party.
Ideologically, the political parties were broadly either liberal or conservative.
From the onset, the GNP was a conservative party and has sustained its ideological
position. This contrasted sharply with Nigeria, where the ideological dispositions
of political parties like the social welfare policy of the Action Group founded by
Obafemi Awolowo could not be sustained among affiliates like the Alliance for
Democracy (AD) after his demise.
Further, South Korea’s political parties are regionally-based and centred on
important personalities who founded, financed, directed and owned the parties.
Korea’s regional and party politics revolved around three major areas, the
Southwestern Cholla region, otherwise known as Honam, the stronghold of the
DP; the Southeastern Kyongsan region, referred to as Yongnam, which is the
major base of the GNP; and the greater Seoul area, which is home for more than
half  of  Korean electorate, which has the swing vote because it determines the
success of the parties in any election.
Regional autocratic hegemons and their narrow interests framed the formation
of political parties in South Korea. From the outset, the leadership of the political
parties was not interested in creating political spaces to accommodate other
politicians who were seeking elective positions in government. Nor has the Korean
political leadership been able to create multiple-seat constituencies to cater for the
interests of  other politicians. As a result, the majority of  politicians cross from
one party to another with their members in search for political opportunities to
realize their political ambitions. This has been a major concern not only for the
electorate in Korea and for democratization of the political parties, but also for
their counterparts in Nigeria.
Between 1948 and 2008, over 60 political parties were formed, disbanded,
merged and participated in Korean politics, but only nine political parties contested
the elections held in August 2008. Of the nine parties, two parties were dominant,
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namely, the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) led by Park Hee-tae; and the
Democratic Party (DEP) with Chung Sye Kyun as leader. The GNP was the de
facto ruling party until 2007. Other parties were the Liberty Forward Party (LFP)
led by Lee Hoi-chang, who was the presidential nominee of the GNP in 1997/
2002, but defected to launch the LFP. The Pro-Park Coalition (Park) had Suh
Chung-won as its leader; the Creative Korean Party (CKP) was led by Moon
Kook-hyun, and the New Progressive Party (NPP) led by Roh Hoe-chan, which
was a split from the Democratic Labour Party. A number of  independent
candidates also stand for office.
To all appearances, South Korean political parties were weak, lacked internal
democratic practices and became vehicles for surplus accumulation by politicians.
The political leaders only used the political parties to build an army of  followers
that was disempowered and could not succeed them. The resultant implosion of
the parties caused splinter groups to form their own parties to actualize their
political ambitions. But that further disenfranchised the majority of  the people
from participating in party politics, because the newly formed parties were too
weak to recruit members besides those they decamped with.
That is not all. The opposition parties and their internal politics can vary but
they remain uniformly undemocratic. Yet it is not the case that party politics
among African and Asian polities is merely an extension of a larger, all-inclusive
family, nurtured by the traditional political culture. For even within the single party
system, the party leadership was undemocratic.
Worse still, the majority of  the political leaders in the opposition have, on an
account of their narrow political, social and economic interests, either reconciled
with the old order or crossed the floor, taking with them their parties and
membership. All this has further reduced opposition politics to the politics of
survival. Let me elaborate on this.
In Nigeria, Mohammed Buhari, the presidential candidate of the major
opposition party the ANPP in the April 2007 election, had appealed to the Supreme
Court against the judgment of  the Tribunal that endorsed Umaru Yar’ Adua as
President of  Nigeria and legitimately elected under the ticket of  the PDP. This
was in spite of  Yar’ Adua’s admission that the election was not free and fair.
Ironically, the President proposed a government of  national unity (GNU) to
accommodate the interests of the opposition, as the GNU has become a
framework for legitimizing fraudulent elections in Africa. (Another example of
this trend is President Moi Kibaki’s unity government in Kenya. His opponent
Raila Odinga was the acclaimed winner of the 2008 general election, but after the
bloody post-election violence which claimed thousands of lives, a government
of  national unity was formed with Odinga forced to accept second position as
Prime Minister.)
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The President of Nigeria had invited the ANPP to nominate candidates for
consideration by the government, but Buhari declined the offer. However, the
national chairman of  the ANPP, Ume Ezeoke, one-time Speaker of  the Federal
House of  Representative, objected to Buhari’s decision, insisting that the party
should participate. When the Yar’ Adua-led government requested the ANPP to
suggest names for consideration, Ezeoke reportedly nominated himself. Even
when his name was turned down by the government, he suggested his son for
possible consideration. Again, it was rejected.
The issue, therefore, is not really whether the political elite is faced with sticking
to an alleged tradition of  a political system that did not permit much acknowledged
opposition, or that they fear a clash of  civilization, culture and interests. On the
contrary, those who are in opposition are not significantly different from their
counterparts in government. Both share the common interest of capturing the
state’s instrument of  political power for selfish social and economic gains. Thus
there is even the possibility that the weak leadership of the opposition parties
could slide Nigeria into a single party state in spite of the huge potential for a
robust opposition.
In South Korea, the same trend of a weak opposition and the practice of
floor-crossing by politicians was established. For instance, the Liberty Forward
Party led by Lee Hoi-chang broke away from the GNP after he failed to secure
the presidential ticket in the 1997/2002 elections. Hoi-chang moved from the
party with his members, a trend that is similar to the practice in Nigeria, where an
incumbent governor in Bauchi State defected from the ANPP on whose ticket he
won, to the PDP.
South Korea’s National Legislature was weakened by the overwhelming control
of  the seats by the GNP, a long-time conservative opposition party before it
recently won the presidential election. The two dominant parties, GNP and DP,
had acquired the notoriety of not cooperating with each other while the other
was in power. Little wonder that the DP, the major opposition, took a hard-line
position against the GNP.  Even within these two major political parties, the
prospects of new entrants fulfilling their political ambitions were slim, as the top
leadership of the two organizations usually handpicked candidates for elected
positions without giving members the liberty to vote. The lack of democratization
within the political parties exacerbated the zero-sum politics of  South Korea’s
body politic.
Concluding Remarks: Any Prospect for the DDS?
From all indications, the feasibility of the DDS in Nigeria and South Korea given
the nature of the political leadership is doubtful. It is all the more so because the
process of  democratization has not even started among political parties. The
polity cannot be democratized without the political parties internalizing a democratic
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ethos and the parties cannot play the crucial role of educating, raising and nurturing
democratic political leadership if they are not democratic in thought and action.
While the steps that could be taken to bring about a truly democratic
developmental state are implicit in the preceding analysis, it might be useful to put
forward some explicit recommendations regarding the democratization of
governance in the entire development process generally and political parties in
particular.
First, civil society organizations (CSOs) should be brought into the heart of
the process of  democratizing development and politics. Only such independent
bodies offer the hope of acting as a check on the obnoxious and ambiguous
policies of the state and its failure to deliver the public good. The CSOs can also
backstop the political parties in order to instil elements of democratic practices in
their governance machineries. Practically, a coalition of  CSOs can mount pro-
democracy demonstrations to protest the state’s glaringly undemocratic approach
to politics, the decay in infrastructure, and the irrelevance of the political leadership
to the actual conditions of  the people. Groups similar to the Pastor Tunde Bakare-
led Save Nigeria Group (SNG), could be created to protest the state’s reluctance
to compile a new voters register for the April 2011 elections in Nigeria. Such
groups could lend their weight to reforms such as the liberalization of  registration
of  political parties. It is imperative to revitalize the seemingly docile CSOs such as
the CLO, CD, CDHR and NADECO whose protracted agitation chased the
military out of the political scene between 1988 and 1993.
Second, there is the urgent need for labour unions and student groups to re-
radicalize and fight the deepening corruption and undemocratic practices in public
institutions and the political parties in South Korea. The historic Kyonju massacre
was a mark of prolonged resistance to the autocratic state by students, labour
and academics in the 1950s, and indicates that the potential for sustained opposition
goes deep in the South Korean political heritage.
Third, it recommends the creation of movements that would empower the
people, groups and communities to form social, political and environmental
movements on critical development issues. These movements can provide a
credible platform for the formation of  political parties. Once the leadership and
members of a movement imbibe basic elements of democratic governance such
as openness, accountability and responsiveness, they would have been prepared
for training and nurturing the political parties that could spring from such
movements. That way, it would be more difficult for opportunistic politicians to
hijack parties to actualize personal gains.
Fourth, there is the need for the movements to be transformed into a
countervailing social and political force to check the repressive state and its injustices
to the people. The state’s policies and politics in the natural resource sector in
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Nigeria are clearly undemocratic. The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger
Delta (MEND), created by a group of activists in the region, has sought to
redress the situation. MEND is aimed at actualizing the resource rights of the
people in the region after three decades of ruthless exploitation by the state and
foreign oil capital. The activities of  MEND crippled Nigeria’s oil exports under
then Yar’ Adua’s government and the Movement is watching closely the
implications of the impending Petroleum Industry Bill for the Delta region before
it takes the next step. The resource control movement could have been another
formidable force to confront the predatory Nigerian state, but it lacked
coordination and collapsed.
Fifth, it suggests the need to establish a Special Court for Electoral Crimes.
This Special Court would to bring to trial and sentence politicians found guilty of
election rigging and the manipulation of  the electoral process, together with the
requirement that repayment the monies acquired in office be repaid to the public
purse. Also, such political parties should be prohibited from once again putting
forward candidates whose election was nullified in the re-run. This will stem the
woeful trend of having the Appeal Courts nullify the election of the governors
of  PDP-controlled states of  Ondo, Ekiti and Osun in the 2007 election, only to
have the same personnel declared the winners of the gubernatorial elections in
these states in 2010. The Labour Party reclaimed Ondo in 2009 after the illegitimate
PDP government was in power for over a year while Action Congress of Nigeria
won Ekiti and Osun States after the PDP was in government for a three-quarters
of  the four year tenure. Yet the ousted governors who stole the mandate of  the
people were not punished.
Sixth, this analysis suggests that there is a need for a truly autonomous
national electoral body that is solely responsible for the conduct of  elections.
The head of such a body should be appointed by the national legislature and its
funding charged to the national account. Not only would all this help to insulate
the electoral umpire from the influences of top politicians and the leaders of
political parties, but would help energize the process of democratization and
reformation of  the state.
Clearly, the factions and groups within the political leadership that benefit
enormously from the current structure of  the state in Nigeria and South Korea
will resist democratization. But the contradictions thrown up by the policies and
politics of the state and the leadership of the parties are reviving pro-democracy
agitations and revolutionary tendencies across Latin America and Africa countries.
There seems to be only one path for the post-colonial state in Nigeria and South
Korea, and that is to democratize the development process or risk mass action
and revolution. Discussion of  this topic is taken further in Chapter Four.
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